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The cascade of financial distress that hit most developing
countries after the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 1981
has been a major threat to the international financial and
trading order in the 1980s and early 1990s. To defuse the
crisis, distressed debtors, overly exposed lenders, and inter-
national institutions have repeatedly engaged in often dra-
matic rounds of bargaining over the rescheduling of loans.
What has been the result of these negotiations? In fact,
there has been significant variation over time and across
cases in the extent to which debtors have undertaken
economic adjustment, banks have written down debts, and
creditor governments and international organizations have
intervened in the bargaining process. The central aim of
Debt Games is to explain this variation through an impres-
sive theoretical, comparative, and historical analysis span-
ning 170 years of debt rescheduling involving Latin Amer-
ican countries.
The book goes significantly beyond standard game-theo-
retic approaches to model international interactions. Most
studies simply read actors' preferences off the bargaining
outcome, or at best provide only casual empirical evidence
for assigned payoffs. Instead, this work provides the reader
with an operationalizable game-theoretic model based on a
"situational theory" of bargaining. The approach consists of a
formal method to derive payoffs for actors depending on
their basic goals and their individual situations. Based on a
set of coding rules, the analyst simply has to code the three
variables that define an actor's situation—debt rescheduling
resources, overall capabilities, and coalitional stability. The
theory then allows one to derive a game structure for the
bilateral interaction between lenders and debtors, as well as
some informal insights on how the game might change in the
future either through actors' efforts or through intervention
by third parties. To solve the games for bargaining outcomes,
the only formal skill that a potential user of the model needs
is an understanding of the concept of Nash equilibrium to
solve static normal form games.
The carefully designed theoretical framework pays off in
the empirical work. The author examines 61 cases of debt
rescheduling involving Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru
over the last 170 years. He divides this long time period into
four epochs defined by overall systemic factors and analyzes
variation in outcomes across these different epochs. Overall,
the model successfully predicts debt rescheduling outcomes
in 85% of the cases. The book also has some interesting
policy implications, including the fact that a limited set of
structural conditions appears to determine the behavior of
actors. Decision makers should therefore not be caught
unprepared for the inevitable next crisis of debt rescheduling.
Such an ambitious study involves a series of modeling
assumptions and coding rules that are open to challenge.
Obviously, empirical coding of discrete variables remains a
subjective enterprise, and readers may question some of the
61 cases included in the book. But Aggarwal has the basic
point right: His predictions can be falsified, and the burden of
proof is on his critics. There are, however, more serious
potential questions worth considering. First, whereas the
trend in international relations has been toward the analysis
of the role of limited information, Aggarwal's games are
complete information games. Lenders and debtors do not
know what the other one will do, but they always know the
structure of the game based on the actors' individual situa-
tions. Aggarwal argues that this assumption of complete
information is a better approximation of actors' behavior
than using incomplete information because, "as we shall see
in the empirical cases, actors generally have a good sense of
the kinds of actors they face in negotiations" (p. 57). He
claims in the concluding chapter that his empirical work
provides support for this assertion, but I have difficulty with
the assumption that an actor can always be sure of his
opponent's domestic coalitional stability, irrespective of the
kind of domestic political system. Uncertainty about an
opponent's domestic processes tends to be a major source of
influence on outcomes of international negotiations. I do not
see why this would not apply to debt rescheduling. The
author does point to the trade-offs involved in relaxing the
condition of complete information. Each actor could be
facing eight or more possible types of opponents. To my
knowledge no one has ever done something similar. Most of
the existing work that tests limited information models either
assumes two types of actors or a continuum of types (which
would make empirical coding a nightmare).
Second, the book's treatment of change is questionable. In
Aggarwal's model, new outcomes in future bargaining inter-
actions may come from change in actors' individual situations
owing to their dissatisfaction with bargaining outcomes or
because of exogenous shocks. Dissatisfied actors may attempt
to manipulate either their own or their opponent's individual
situation and use power resources, norms and rules, or allies
to achieve their goal. While this is an intriguing argument, the
book does not provide any systematic way of applying this
intuitive logic to the games beyond estimating a likelihood of
change. There is no endogenous treatment of change through
the repeated analysis of normal form games, only some
indirect assessment through the concept of goodwill, which is
discussed at length in a technical appendix.
Third, the modeling of strategic interaction does not
include the behavior of third-party organizations or govern-
ments. Instead, the author follows a "simple utility maximiz-
ing decision rule under certainty" (p. 79) to explain the
behavior of these actors. Although he agrees that this is a
"significant simplification" (p. 79), Aggarwal gives no sub-
stantive justification for this choice.
In sum, the discussion on these three important modeling
assumptions boils down to the trade-offs that any scholar
has to make between theoretical elegance and empirical
robustness. It should be obvious to anyone who has tried to
apply game-theoretic models to in-depth empirical studies
that Aggarwal needed to make modeling choices. The
author is relatively unique in his openness in presenting an
autocritique of his approach. The question for a reviewer,
then, is to decide whether the choices he made yield a
compelling analytical account of debt rescheduling. On
this score, Debt Games is a tour de force. It is well
balanced, with a nice mix of abstract concepts, real-world
indicators, and empirical richness that goes beyond "illus-
trative" case studies. I have no doubt that one could make
a different set of trade-offs between theoretical complexity
and empirical applicability. But this impressive book
should serve as a useful benchmark for years to come.
Scholars and graduate students alike will find it to be a
valuable source of modeling ideas that goes well beyond
the examination of international debt rescheduling.
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